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Facing rising natural hazards, urban environments are particularly prone to suffer economic impacts 14 from business interruptions due to disaster-induced lifeline service disruptions. Enhancing the ability 15 of local economies to maintain function and hasten recovery in the aftermath of natural disasters 16 triggers the need to both measure economic resilience and better understand its drivers. Based on a 17 conceptual framework that highlights the peculiarities of resilience with respect to vulnerability and 18 adaptation, this paper develops a scientifically sound operational indicator of the economic resilience 19 of individual businesses to lifeline service interruptions caused by natural disasters. The indicator is 20 constructed so as to compare patterns of economic resilience across firms or events and identify 21 hotspots of poor resilience that public policies should target as a priority. In order to demonstrate its 22 scientific and operational relevance, it is applied to individual businesses located in the Urban 23
Community of Central Martinique (French West Indies). A business survey is used to collect empirical 24 data for two hypothetical equal hazard scenarios leading to the disruption of the drinking water and 25 electricity networks. An econometric analysis then investigates the dependence of economic resilience 26 to a set of individual characteristics such as business demographics and operating characteristics. 27 Results show that businesses are relatively more resilient to drinking water interruptions than to 28 electricity cuts and that turnover and flexibility in both working hours and production processes are 29 significant drivers of economic resilience. We discuss the limitations of this indicator and pinpoint the 30 challenge for future research of isolating pre-existing sensitivity to shocks from overall economic 31 impacts. 32 Keywords: Economic resilience; indirect impacts; resilience indicator; business interruption; lifeline 33 service disruption; disaster risk reduction. 34 35
Introduction 36
In upcoming decades, impacts of natural disasters are likely to increase because of both changes in the 37 occurrence and severity of extreme events and changes in the exposure and vulnerability of societies to 38 natural hazards (IPCC, 2014) . Meanwhile, the uncertainty of future threats and the complexity of 39 integrated social, technical and economic systems, increase the challenge of performing disaster risk 40 analysis, especially in dense urban environments. Because their results highly depend on uncertain and 41 often unprecedented natural phenomenon, classical risk assessments are likely not to be sufficient to 42 provide decision-makers with robust risk reduction strategies. A more pragmatic approach to disaster 43 risk reduction consists in building resilience in socio-ecological systems in order to strengthen their 44 ability to recover and adapt from adverse events of any kind (Linkov et al, 2014) . Resilience 45 assessments allow scaling-up the analysis framework so as to both enhance recovery and reduce risk 46 while avoiding thoroughly accounting for the peculiarities of the initial hazard characteristics. As 47 such, they improve upon risk assessments to support decision-making under uncertainty. 48
Because they are the ultimate decision-makers of economic systems, businesses are a cornerstone in 49 building resilience of local economies. Their resilience, that is their ability to cope with new physical 50 and market conditions and maintain operations under stress, is crucial in the aftermath of extreme 51 events. They ensure the provision of goods and services that are essential to sustain livelihoods and 52 secure incomes for households, hastening thereby the recovery of entire communities. Measuring and 53
understanding their resilience to disaster risks is an important contribution to design efficient 54 resilience enhancement strategies (Smit & Wandel, 2006; Vincent, 2007) . However, any attempt to 55 measure the economic resilience of businesses requires understanding their recovery process, which in 56 turn depends upon the economic impacts they are likely to suffer. 57
Economic impacts of natural disasters fall into two broad categories: direct impacts, which arise 58 directly from physical impacts, such as the cost of replacing a damaged building, and indirect impacts 59 which are second-order downstream effects that result from the diffusion of physical impacts across 60 the wider economic system, such as production loss due to water shortages caused by a damaged pipe 61 or increased production costs due to health related absenteeism (Hallegatte et al., 2011; Pelling et 62 al., 2002; Tierney, 2007) . Because they have a straightforward and tangible effect on the economy and 63 are mostly covered by private insurances, it is standard practice to assess direct economic impacts in 64 the aftermath of natural disasters (André et al. 2013) . Indirect economic impacts are however more 65 complex to capture. Hallegatte & Przyluski (2010) provide a few explanations for this shortcoming, 66 among which the longer time span and larger spatial scale of indirect impacts or the fact that they vary 67 across sectors and economic agents. Yet, in the long-run, indirect impacts add to total economic 68 impacts of disasters to an extent that often exceeds direct physical damages (Rose & Liao, 2005; 69 Tierney, 1997). Thus, capturing these indirect impacts is of prime importance to measure economic 70 resilience in its entirety. 71
The literature on the assessment of indirect impacts and economic resilience of businesses is scarce. 72 Hallegatte (2008) developed an approach based on input-output tables to model economic impacts 73 through input supply and demand variations across economic sectors, accounting for propagations and 74 adaptive behaviors. Brozovic et al. (2007) developed a methodology that consists in compiling sector 75 specific (typology dependent) demand functions from different sources in order to assess the total 76 costs of water lifeline interruptions following severe earthquakes in California both for business and 77 residential water users. These approaches can be characterized as top-down or standardized normative 78 approaches that disregard the particularities of individual businesses within a sector. As pointed out by 79 Kajitani & Tatano (2009) , such classical estimations of economic damages to production losses 80 account for restrictions of production capacity in an adhoc manner but do not integrate vulnerability 81
and resilience of businesses to assess production capacity losses, although Hallegatte (2008) attempted 82
to integrate adaptive behaviors in its approach. This is partly due to the lack of a common 83 understanding of the multidimensional nature of economic resilience that differs from -but also 84 encompasses aspects of -vulnerability and adaptation. Omitting that resilience is not only sector 85 dependent but rather depend on individual characteristics that reflect the organization of the firm and 86 affect its ability to recover from a shock leads to frequent misinterpretations. 87 This paper presents a complementary approach to standard, sector-typology based approaches 88 described above in order to assess and investigate the processes and factors underlying individual 89 economic resilience of businesses. Its ambition is to make the best use of the available theory in a very 90 pragmatic goal: measuring and understanding the resilience of businesses in order to provide public 91 policies with recommendations for building resilient economies. We first develop an explicit 92 conceptual framework of the economic resilience of individual businesses that integrates and clarifies 93 the relationships between resilience, adaptation and vulnerability. We then develop an aggregated 94
indicator of economic resilience that addresses some of the current scientific and technical obstacles 95 regarding the measurement of economic resilience at individual scale. The strength of our 96 methodology lies in its ability to scientifically ground an operational measurement of microeconomic 97 resilience that accounts for both the individual ability to cope with potential impacts and the timing of 98 recovery. As an illustration, the indicator is then applied to businesses of the particularly prone to cut-offs and outages, especially in the event of a natural disaster. As for economic 105 impacts, they are likely to be significant because the economy of the French West Indies is mostly 106 made of small businesses, often thinly capitalized and individually owned, that do not benefit from 107 strong support functions to help them anticipate and cope with potential impacts. 108
This research focuses on the microeconomic resilience of businesses to lifeline service interruptions, 109 and as such, does not account for macroeconomic effects of natural disasters that pertain to the overall 110 systemic resilience of the economy. However, the concepts and indicators produced may contribute to 111 adapt production functions in macroeconomic models such as CGE models as suggested by Rose & 112 Liao (2005) who argue that classical models do not account for resilience and as such, tend to either 113 overestimate (e.g. when adaptations are not accounted for), or underestimate (e.g. when a systematic 114 return to equilibrium is considered after a long period of time), the effects of natural hazards on the 115 economy. Concentrating on microeconomic processes allows our analysis to focus on the intrinsic 116 ability of individual businesses to recover and adapt to a given degraded situation, disregarding the 117 characteristics of the event that generates damages and indirect market effects such as dropping 118 demand or increasing supply prices. It focuses on private businesses that are operated for profit, as 119 opposed to public sector and non-profit organizations. This includes all types of business 120
proprietorship, irrespective of their sector, size and turnover. 121
The present paper is organized as follows. We develop a conceptual framework for economic 122 resilience and describe its theoretical foundations in section 2. We then propose in section 3 an 123 original methodology to measure and assess the economic resilience of individual businesses. Results 124 of the application of this indicator-based approach are presented in section 4. In particular, the socio-125 economic drivers of economic resilience are investigated using a linear regression model. Section 5 126 discusses the interests and the limits of our methodology and section 6 concludes by presenting a set 127 of future perspectives to this work. 128
Conceptual framework for the economic resilience of individual businesses 129
Building on existing literature, we suggest a conceptual framework that highlights the composite 130 nature of economic resilience at the microeconomic level ( Fig. 1 ). This framework clarifies the 131 relationships existing between vulnerability, adaptation and resilience. In doing so, it provides an 132 analytical basis that is consistent with approaches developed in both risk and economic conceptual 133 models (Sedan et al, 2013; Aulong et al, 2011; Hallegatte & Przyluski, 2010) . 134
Vulnerability 135
Natural disaster risks result from the interaction of (1) a hazard, that is the potential occurrence of a 136 natural or human-induced physical event that may cause damage, harm or adverse effects, (2) the 137 exposure, that is the presence of stakes (e.g. people, assets, resources) in places and settings that could 138 be adversely affected; and (3) the vulnerability, which is the propensity or predisposition of 139 individuals, communities and the environment to be adversely affected (IPCC, 2014) . Focused on 140 hazard as the triggering mechanism, vulnerability is commonly defined in the literature on disaster 141 risks as the sensitivity of exposed elements to hazards (Papathoma-Köhle et al., 2011) or as the degree 142 to which a system is likely to experience damages due to its exposure to a hazard (Turner et al., 2003 propensity or predisposition that depends not only upon the character and intensity of the hazard to 147 which a system is exposed, but also upon its lack of capacity to adapt, its sensitivity or susceptibility to 148 harm, and its social, economic and institutional organization and development pathways (IPCC, 2014). 149
This interpretation acknowledges that, by enhancing coping capacities, adaptation is a mean to reduce 150 vulnerability (Pelling, 2010) , and that vulnerability is directly connected to the intrinsic characteristics 151 of individuals and communities ( physical (or material) vulnerability that relates to the physical resistance of an element exposed to a 157 hazard (e.g. the resistance of a building to an earthquake); systemic (or functional) vulnerability that 158 depends on the functional organization of a system (e.g. the importance of a road section in the overall 159 transportation network given its spatial distribution and actual use by city-dwellers); and socio-160 economic vulnerability that pertains to the intrinsic socio-economic characteristics and abilities of 161 individuals (e.g. the propensity of a business to get help from its professional network). 162
Adaptation 163
Adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual or expected disasters or stresses and their effects 164 (IPCC, 2014 Tompkins & Eakin, 2012). In particular, their timing of implementation allows distinguishing 174 anticipatory or pro-active adaptations that are deliberate decisions to prepare for potential effects (e.g. 175 having a generator at disposal to cope with potential power cuts, i.e. ex-ante) from reactive adaptations 176 that are carried out in response to a specific event (e.g. buying a generator once the power is off, i.e. 177 ex-post) (Fankhauser et al., 1999) . Despite the diversity of their definitions and rationales, most 178 scientists agree that adaptation actions are manifold, both technological and behavioral (incl. 179 organizational), and that they aim at reducing risks and fostering coping capacities. In our conceptual 180 framework, adaptation is defined as any adjustment or transformative process that allows either pre-181 event risk reduction, in-time or post-event risk coping. We consider as crucial the distinction between 182 pro-active and reactive adaptations, with pro-active adaptations being a driver of the wider concept of 183 vulnerability. 184
Resilience 185
Resilience results from both adaptation actions and vulnerability. Often described as the opposite of 186 vulnerability, the concept of resilience has recently become a buzzword in the disaster risk literature. 187
Used in various ways by ecological, psychological or social sciences to reflect the ability of a system 188 to respond to disturbances, self-organize, learn and adapt, the concept is subject to multiple 189
interpretations (Alexander, 2013 relies on actions carried out to reduce the impacts of specific events or to transform to better cope with 197 these events. But it differs from vulnerability in that it pertains to post-disaster outcomes and only 198 becomes operational in the aftermath of an event, when vulnerability characterizes a pre-existing 199 condition. However, resilience can also be strengthened prior to a disaster by pro-active measures that 200 increase the capacity of a system to cope with upcoming effects. To clarify this time-related duality, 201
Rose (2009) identifies two components of economic resilience: inherent and adaptive resilience. 202
Inherent resilience pertains to abilities that were part of the system prior to disasters. It is resilience 203 already built in the system (e.g. the ability to use inventories in case of supply outages). Adaptive 204 resilience arises out of ingenuity under stress and pertains to decisions made during and in the 205 aftermath of disasters (e.g. the ability to substitute inputs given newly available materials) (Rose, 206 2004; Rose et al., 2013; Tierney, 2007) . Together, inherent and adaptive resilience enable individuals 207 and communities to avoid potential losses by returning as quickly as possible to an equilibrium state, 208 may it be steady or dynamic. Based on the definition proposed by Rose (2009), we define economic 209 resilience as the capacity to absorb an initial shock through pro-active adaptation, and to respond and 210 adapt afterwards through reactive adaptation, so as to maintain function and hasten recovery, as well 211
as to be in a better position to reduce losses from future disasters. This definition is consistent with 212
Birkmann et al. (2013) who differentiate the concept of resilience into a coping part that deals with the 213 'here and now' capacity and resort to a set of actions currently available to those at risk and an 214 adaptation part that deals with the longer-term process of learning and reorganizing. However, it goes 215 behind by considering that the equilibrium state in which the system returns may or may not be the 216 pre-existing (or current) state. This echoes the recent distinction made by Manyena et al. (2011) 217 between bouncing back and forward after a shock. Initially used as a bounce back notion measuring 218 the propensity of a system to return to its previous equilibrium in order to preserve its overall stability 219 (Holling, 1973; Timmerman, 1981) , resilience can also be considered as a bounce forward notion 220
allowing a system to come back stronger and move on by rebuilding itself and hereby changing from 221 the original state (Manyena et al., 2011) . 222
Building on the literature background presented upfront, we suggest a conceptual framework that 223 provides an analytic setting for resilience assessments at individual scale ( Fig.1 ). Our framework 224 highlights the essential place of time in the resilience concept. It distinguishes two periods in coping 225 with disaster risks: (i) the short term, also called immediate aftermath, when impacts of disasters are 226 strongly felt and coping capacity depends on the inherent resilience already built in the system that 227 relies upon pre-existing vulnerability and pro-active adaptation measures, (ii) the medium term, also 228 called reactive period, when the business has organized and implemented measures to deal with the 229 impacts and where the adaptive resilience expresses. Adaptive resilience depends upon the magnitude 230 of the impacts felt in the short to medium terms as well as the reactive adaptations undertaken in 231 response to these impacts. Overall long-term economic resilience is the aggregated inherent and 232 adaptive resilience. In this paper, we focus on the economic dimension of resilience. Other types of 233 physical or systemic resilience could also be investigated using the same framework. However, this 234 work falls outside the scope of this paper. 235 
Material and method 237

Background on indicators of economic resilience 238
Measuring economic resilience is not a trivial exercise. It faces three main difficulties. First, resilience 239 is a composite measure of adaptation actions, pre-existing vulnerability and actual impacts on business 240
activities, which in turn depend on the magnitude of the hazard and the exposure of the business. 241
Therefore, any attempt to provide a complete and integrated resilience indicator should encompass its 242 multidimensional nature. Second, it pertains to characteristics and actions existing and occurring 243 before, during and after a disaster. Therefore, indicators should account for the dynamic of the process. 244
Third, resilience is driven by individual socio-economic characteristics and behaviors, some of which 245 are made manifest only when individuals are faced with a disaster. Relevant indicators should account 246
for individual choices. 247
Two main approaches can be distinguished in building business-level economic resilience indicators. 248
A first approach consists in characterizing an indicator of resilience with an apriori (deductive) 249 approach. It calculates indexes based on a set of publicly available observed characteristics of firms. 250 Eidsvig et al. (2014) and Oxford Metrica (2015) built business resilience to supply chain disruption 251 indexes at country level combining economic, risk quality and supply chain factors, each described 252 using three drivers. The nine drivers combined with equal weights enable to calculate a resilience 253 index. However, these approaches cannot account for post-disaster reactive adaptations nor for 254 differences in individual firm behaviors, and as such do not fit our concept. A second literature strand 255
relies on a more empirical approach and consists in calculating a microeconomic economic resilience 256
indicator as a measure of the ex-post economic impact of disasters. Such an approach has been 257 developed by Rose (2009 the economic resilience consisting in emphasizing on the capacity to recover after an event and to 280 reorganize. Darnhofer (2010) suggests to measure economic resilience in the farming sector as the 281 inverse of the cost incurred by the firm because of the event. This is consistent with the view that 282 vulnerability is the opposite of resilience and supports the idea of taking a monetary impact on the 283 output as a measure of resilience although it does not account for the multidimensional nature of the 284 process. 285
One of the main limits of these measures of economic resilience is that they integrate vulnerability and 286 resilience components with a global impact measure, which does not allow isolating the ultimate 287 economic impact from the inherent vulnerability component. This illustrates the difficulty to maintain 288 the two concepts of vulnerability and resilience separate as soon as it comes to metrics. In our 289 perspective, this is of interest to really understand the process of individual resilience whose added 290 value as an analytical concept stems from its ability to capture not only the predisposition to be 291 affected but also the rebound capacity when faced with a destructive event. 292
Metrics of economic resilience 293
Based on the previous literature review, we suggest measuring economic resilience (ER) of individual 294 businesses to lifeline service interruptions with an integrated indicator that accounts for long-term 295 impacts and pre-existing vulnerability separately. ER is measured as: 296
(1) 297
With: 298 -, the percentage change in business turnover during the event; 299 -, the other market impacts incurred by businesses during the event (e.g. increasing 300
production costs, penalties dues to non-compliance with commercial contracts); 301 -, the non-market impacts incurred by businesses during the event (e.g. increasing 302
painfulness of work, damages to reputation, stress of the workforce); 303 -, the recovery period, that is the length of time that separates the occurrence of the event from 304 the return to normalcy of business activities; 305 -, the equilibrium state, that is an indicator of the new level of activity reached by businesses 306 in the long-run; 307 -, the sensitivity, that is the level of dependence of business activities to the lifeline service 308 under study ; 309 -, the long-term economic impacts of the disaster; 310 -, the immediate (short-term) economic impacts of the disaster. 311
Here, economic resilience is defined as an aggregated indicator of the overall economic impacts 312 suffered by a business following a disaster, given its pre-existing vulnerability to the disaster. Its 313 calculation requires computing two economic impact indexes successively: (i) an aggregated 314
immediate economic impact index ( that accounts for the strength of the impact during the disaster 315 and encompasses three indicators (change in turnover, other market impacts and non-market impacts), 316
and (ii) an aggregated long-term economic impact index ( that accounts for the overall impact of 317 the disaster once business operations returned to normalcy and encompasses three indicators 318
(immediate economic impacts, recovery time and equilibrium state). includes both market and 319 non-market impacts. Amongst market impacts, demand-side effects resulting in changes in turnover 320 ( ) are distinguished from supply-side effects resulting in additional costs for businesses (i.e. 321 monetary damages) ( . also accounts for pro-active and reactive adaptation actions. Since it 322 depicts the effects of the disaster, given the inherent characteristics of the business, the component 323
already captures the effect of pro-active adaptation actions. As for reactive adaptations, we consider 324 that they allow reducing the duration of the impacts which is captured by the recovery time 325 component ). The nature of the equilibrium state reached by businesses once their activity has 326 returned to normalcy is captured by an indicator ( ) that differentiates bouncing back from bouncing 327 forward profiles. When understanding and assigning values to these metrics, a particular attention has 328 to be given to avoiding double counting (see also how this is handled for a specific case in our 329 illustration). To avoid double counting of pro-active adaptations that are already embodied in the 330 resilience indicator through , we only keep in the formula the sensitivity component ( ) of 331 vulnerability, sensitivity being defined as the vulnerability from which pro-active adaptations are 332 removed. In our case, sensitivity is approximated by the root cause of the impact, namely the level of 333 dependency of business activities to lifeline services, disregarding any pro-active adaptation that could 334
have been implemented to reduce this sensitivity (e.g. having a water tank at disposal in case of water 335 outages). Double counting may also arise from overlapping between , and . For instance, 336 some non-market impacts may affect turnover (e.g. increasing stress of the workers may impact 337 productivity). However, all these components are isolated in the formula in order to acknowledge that 338
the impact that they capture should be accounted for in their essence (e.g. stress is per se a "damage" 339 to the employee) and not only because they have an effect on turnover. Figure 2 illustrates the 340 performance profiles of businesses during and after an event in a dynamic way. It enables to illustrate 341 several parameters of the economic resilience indicator and relates to the conceptual framework 342 presented upfront. 343
In order to demonstrate the interest of the indicator in understanding factors of resilience, we develop 344 two econometric models that investigate the dependence of economic resilience to a set of individual 345 characteristics (explanatory variables). It is assumed that the economic resilience of individual 346 businesses depends on their demographics (e.g. economic sector, turnover, number of employees), 347 their operating characteristics (e.g. indebtedness, inventories), their owner's characteristics (e.g. age, 348 level of education), and the pro-active and reactive adaptations they are likely to implement when 349 affected by a disaster. 350 island. Damages were mostly material and included several building collapsing and power outages. 364
Besides its geographic location, Martinique is also particularly vulnerable to disaster risks due to the 365 concentration of most of its population, infrastructures and economy within the relatively small 366 perimeter of the UCCM. Located on the Caribbean coast, the UCCM encompasses four municipalities 367
and accounts for 42% of the population and 56% of the total number of businesses registered on the 368 island. Its economy is mainly made of small enterprises, with no or very few employees, exercising 369 mostly in the services, tourism, transport and construction sectors, and focused on local markets 2 . 370
Moreover, the UCCM territory concentrates many critical lifelines and infrastructures whose 371
functioning is crucial to small businesses. Yet, insularity makes those services particularly prone to 372 cut-offs and outages, especially in the event of a natural disaster. 373
Data collection 374
Because our approach requires aggregating a set of observed variables to build an indicator, it involves 375 recovering a large range of business-level information. Neither public statistical nor private insurance 376 databases provide such disaggregated and specific data. Therefore, we resort to an ex-ante business 377 survey that is particularly fitted to gather site-specific information on individual businesses. It also 378 enables collecting data for a hypothetical equal hazard scenariohere, the disruption of lifeline 379 service networkswhich allows comparing economic impacts disregarding hazard exposure. This 380 would not be possible with a post-event survey that would collect information from firms that were 381 differently impacted because they were originally differently exposed to the hazard according to their 382 geographic location. 383
Our methodology includes a two-step data collection process consisting in a series of face-to-face 384 interviews with local decision makers, natural hazard experts and individual businesses, and in the 385
Internet dissemination of an on-line questionnaire to individual businesses (sees Appendix for details). 386
Interviews were carried out in order to fine-tune the design of the questionnaire in light of empirical 387 information. They helped characterize how network interruptions impact firm activities (e.g. which 388
technical, economic and organizational processes are likely to be affected at firm level) and pre-389 identify a set of adaptation actions likely to be implemented by businesses to cope with these impacts 390 and recover from the shock. 391
The questionnaire focused on the economic impacts resulting from the interruption of lifeline services 392 provided by critical networks in the event of natural disasters. In line with recent local events, two 393 interruption scenarios were exposed to respondents disregarding the natural hazard causing the 394 interruption as well as potential side and macroeconomic effects: an interruption of the drinking water 395 network for one week and an interruption of the electricity network for two days. The questionnaire 396 aimed to collect data in order to (i) calculate individual economic resilience, and (ii) understand the 397 drivers of economic resilience that are embodied in the peculiar characteristics of businesses (e.g. 398 economic sector, annual turnover, geographic location, diversification of activities) and likely to 399 explain their ability to cope with network interruptions. It was designed using Limesurvey 3 , a free and 400 open source on-line survey application. Because it is an eco-friendly, inexpensive, easy to administrate 401 and use process, the questionnaire was disseminated exclusively on the Internet. It was e-mailed from 402
July to October 2015 to businesses registered by three local economic institutions and to members of 403 twenty representative local business associations 4 . It was also publicized on social media (Facebook®, 404
Viadeo® and LinkedIn®). To maximize the response rate, a lottery incentive was eventually added to 405 the survey 5 . 406
Questions were designed so as to recover each component of the resilience indicator. Every metric is 407 thus directly recovered from a question of the survey (Table 1) indicators computed as , with a binary variable taking 1 if impact was suffered by 418 the business and 0 otherwise, and a weighting factor accounting for the importance of each 419 impact on business operations (Table 1) ; 420 -The sensitivity ( is a qualitative weighted indicator computed as , with a 421 binary variable taking 1 if the service is used for the type of activity (e.g. network water 422 used for production, sales, well-being) and 0 otherwise, and a weighting factor accounting 423
for the importance of each activity on business operations (Table 1) . 424
Results 426
Description of the sample 427
Our sample contains 108 individual businesses whose main characteristics are presented in Table 2.  428 Microenterprises -less than 10 employees and an annual turnover inferior to 2M€account for 64% 429 of the sample, half of which are less than 8 years old. The service sector represents 80% of the sample. 430
Respectively 74% and 94% of businesses depend on the drinking water and electricity networks for 431 their operations. Interestingly, only 40% of businesses own their buildings which are also, for 35% of 432 the sample, the ordinary residence of business owners. In line with the peculiarities of the UCCM 433 economy, businesses are rather small enterprises, often thinly capitalized and individually owned. 434
However, it has to be noted that our sample is quite modest with regard to the 29 000 businesses 435 recorded in the perimeter of the UCCM in 2014. Therefore, this case study only aims to illustrate our 436 method and the reader should be aware of the strong limits of our results as they are inferred from a 437 small data set. 438
A set of 19 adaptation actions either currently implemented by businesses or likely to be implemented 439 in the aftermath of lifeline service interruptions was identified through face-to-face interviews and 440 assessed in the survey (Fig.3) . Pro-active adaptations include inventories that enables keeping on 441
producing even in case of default of the supplier, business interruption insurance, risk management 442 procedures, membership in professional groups and well-functioning substitution solutions to the 443 service network (e.g. private well for drinking water, power generator for electricity). During and after 444 the shutdown, reactive adaptation actions are related to both supply (e.g. purchasing bottled water, 445 changing procurement processes) and production activities (e.g. relocating operations, lengthening 446 working hours). Although their relative frequency of implementation depends on the shutdown 447 scenario investigated, all businesses but one already set up at least one pro-active adaptation and most 448 of them would adopt both reactive and pro-active adaptations when faced with lifeline service 449
interruptions. Owning a substitute to the electricity network is the most frequent pro-active adaptation 450
implemented by businesses while the most frequent reactive adaptations in both scenarios are related 451 to modulating working hours. 452 
Calculation of economic resilience indicators 454
Economic resilience of businesses as defined by (1) requires computing several indicators from raw 455 data of the survey that are transformed according to the details presented in section 3.3. Results are 456 summarized in Table 1 and 2. They apply to both the drinking water network shutdown (DWNS) and 457 the electricity network shutdown (ENS) scenarios. Since the objective is to assess economic resilience 458 with regard to lifeline service interruptions, indicators are computed only for businesses whose 459 activities depend on the considered service 7 . 460 in the questionnaire include production interruptions, sales interruptions, increasing production costs, 470
penalties due to non-compliance with commercial contracts and other impacts on revenues. 471
Respectively 60% and 64% of businesses would incur at least one of these market impacts during the 472 DWNS and the ENS. Using the weighting factors presented in Fig.3 , ranges on a scale from 0 to 473 9. On average, it is slightly higher for the ENS (2.3) than for the DWNS (2.0). 474
Non-market impacts ( 475
Non-market impacts vary greatly according to the scenarios. For instance, the ENS would lead to 476 delays in the supply chain for half of businesses, against only 21% following the DWNS. Overall, 477 more than two third of businesses would suffer disruptions in their organization (e.g. drudgery of 478 work, waste of time) in both scenarios. On a scale of 0 to 12, reaches on average 5.1 for the ENS 479 and 3.8 for the DWNS. 480
Recovery time ( 481
With 83% of businesses returning to normalcy after the week that would last the DWNS and only 59% 482 after the two days of the ENS, the recovery time is relatively longer for the ENS than for the DWNS. 483 This means that in the long-run, the longer interruption for the DWNS than for the ENS does not 484 outweigh the relative stronger overall immediate economic impacts when faced with electricity 485 outages. Since depends on the duration of the event, its scale varies according to the scenarios. It 486 ranges from 1 to 4 for the DWNS and from 1 to 8 for the ENS. 487
Equilibrium state ( 488
A significant share of businesses would not return to their initial level of activity after one year. 489
Respectively 43% and 17% of businesses have a bounce back profile for the DWNS and the ENS, 490 while only one business presents a bounce forward profile for the ENS. Both the recovery time and the 491 equilibrium state indicators suggest a stronger struggle to return to normalcy when faced with 492 electricity outages. 493
Sensitivity 494
Scores of sensitivity highlight that businesses resort more to electricity for operating activities than to 495
water. When 79% of businesses use drinking water for current use of their staff, only 49% use 496 electricity for that purpose. Conversely, when 67% of businesses resort to electricity for production 497 and sales, they are only 39% to resort to drinking water to this end. As a consequence, overall 498 sensitivity is higher for the ENS than for the DWNS, with scores of respectively 7.8 and 5 on a scale 499 of 0 to 16. This means that by construction, since sensitivity is the denominator of the economic 500 resilience indicator, if a business suffers a similar aggregated long-term economic impact in both 501 scenarios, it will be considered as more resilient to the ENS than to the DWNS, because it would have 502 managed to overcome its relative higher pre-existing sensitivity to electricity outages than to water 503 shortages. 504
Economic resilience 505
Economic resilience is computed on a scale of 0 to 100. It reaches on average 86 for the DWNS and 506 75 for the ENS. The stronger resilience of businesses to the DWNS is mainly due to the contribution 507 of the long-term economic impacts that is about three times less for the DWNS than for the ENS. Over 508 the whole sample, the higher sensitivity to ENS is not sufficient to counterbalance the strength of its 509 economic impacts that result in smaller economic resilience of businesses to electricity outages. When 510 both events are considered, aggregated economic resilience of businesses is 80. With regard to these 511
indicators, business profiles are quite diverse, with profiles such as high sensitivity/low impacts and 512 low sensitivity/ high impacts fairly represented in the sample, and only a small, but significant, 513 correlation between the economic resilience to ENS and DWNS. 514 
Insights into the drivers of economic resilience to drinking water interruptions 516
The limited size of the sample prevents us from examining properly all the potential drivers of 517 economic resilience for which data were gathered through the survey. The econometric models are presented in Table 3 . Both models are multiple linear regressions. Model 524
A is an extended model that tests multiple drivers. Model B is a reduced version of Model A. Results 525
show that although annual turnover and number of employees are obviously correlated, they have an 526 opposite effect on economic resilience since it declines with the number of employees and rises with 527 annual turnover. This validates that the less workers there are in the firm, the more flexible the 528 organization is, which eases adaptation and fosters resilience. Turnover is a factor of economic 529 resilience, as previously pointed out by many authors (Chang et al., 2003; Rose et al., 2013 , Tierney, 530 1997 Webb et al., 2002) . Small businesses are more likely to operate with less cash flow 531 which hinders the recruitment of external organizational or logistical support functions to help them 532 anticipate and cope with potential impacts. They are also more likely to be in a precarious financial 533 condition prior to the event, which can be exacerbated by the difficulties emerging from network 534 interruptions. The same point applies to businesses operating in the competitive retail and service 535 sector whose financial stability is more likely to be jeopardized by supply chain disruptions (Tierney, 536 2007) . Other characteristics such as the property ownership, the age of the business, whether the 537 manager lives at his workplace, the indebtedness of the company, and the time relying on stocks have 538 been tested but are not statistically significant in our models. However, model A suggests the age and 539 indebtedness of businesses have a negative effect on resilience while the property ownership, its 540 location as the ordinary residence of the owner and the length of time relying on stocks have positive 541 effects. Such findings are in line with expectancies. However, for the age of the business, assumptions 542
can differ: older businesses are more likely to engage in preparedness activities due to their experience 543 with previous disasters, while younger businesses have a longer planning horizon, less organizational 544 inertia and stronger resources that all together enhance their ability to cope with utility outages. 545
Most pro-active adaptations seem to positively influence economic resilience although none of them is 546 statistically significant in our models. Businesses that subscribe to business interruption insurances are 547 already aware of the risks they encounter and voluntarily intend to broaden their insurance cover 548 against those risks. Therefore, non-mandatory business interruption insurance may be considered as a 549 proxy for engaging in preparedness activities and that is why insured businesses tend to be more 550 resilient. Owning substitution solutions to the water network has a mixed effect on resilience. 551
Although having a well contributes positively to resilience, other types of substitution solutions (e.g. 552
water tank, rainwater collector) do not. An explanation stems from the type of water needs for which 553 wells are used. Conversely to other solutions, most of the businesses that have a private well at 554 disposal use water for production or sales, they are therefore by construction more sensitive to water 555
shortages. However, using their well is likely to reduce the economic impacts they would suffer in 556 case of water shortage which makes them all the more resilient, given their high pre-existing 557 sensitivity. As for membership in professional groups, it is an indicator of the ability of a business to 558 resort to professional solidarity. Model A shows that it is positively correlated with resilience, even 559 though this effect is not statistically significant. 560
We investigate the effect of four reactive adaptations. Results show that the ability to modulate either 561 working hours or production processes is a strong driver of resilience. Businesses that are able to make 562 up the initial production loss by rescheduling operations and working extra hours once the service has 563 been restored are less likely to suffer strong economic impacts in the long-run. Results of Model B 564
suggest that flexibility in production processes increase the economic resilience of businesses by 11 565 points, all other things being equal. Using input substitution and implementing conservation actions 566 (i.e. reducing water consumption) have both positive but not statistically significant effects on 567 resilience. 568 Table 3 . -Approximately here 569
Discussion 570
Any discussion of our results should start by reminding that the case study is a method validation and 571 illustration case study, with no pretence of it representing the economic context of Martinique. That 572 being said, even with the relatively limited and constrained damages assessed here (i.e. one network 573 interruption with no ripple-effect on interrelated networks), results show that impacts of network 574 disruptions could last over a month and cause significant losses to individual businesses. Measures of 575 economic resilience validate the necessity to account for both the immediate economic impacts and the 576 time span of the recovery process since businesses that suffer the higher economic impacts during 577
shutdowns are not necessarily the ones suffering the higher long-term impacts. Results show that 578 businesses are more resilient to DWNS than to ENS which is in line with the findings of Kajitani and 579 Tatano (2009) and with intuitions. This result supports the validation of our indicator as a relevant 580 measure of resilience. However, since the indicator is a relative measure, its scores are not supposed 581 to be interpreted in absolute terms. They only aim to be compared relatively to the scores of other 582 firms or other events. As a consequence, a score of 86 (mean economic resilience to DWNS) is not 583
high per se but should only be considered as higher than a score of 75 (mean economic resilience to 584 ENS). 585
Most results regarding the drivers of economic resilience are coherent with intuitions. In line with 586 previous empirical studies, business size appears as a driver of resilience (Asgary et al., 2012; Chang 587 & Falit-Baiamonte, 2003; Rose et al., 2013; Tierney, 2007) . However, when former studies justified 588 the positive effect of business size on resilience with arguments relying interchangeably on turnover or 589 number of employees, our specification allows demonstrating which attribute of business size actually 590 fosters resilience, namely turnover rather than employees. Results also show that flexibility of working 591 hours and production processes contribute largely to economic resilience (see Park et al. (2011) for a 592 theoretical analysis of the influence of recapturing lost production on economic resilience). This is of 593 particular interest considering that these adaptations may bring other co-benefits to businesses, even in 594 the absence of any disasters (e.g. enhanced business continuity due to compressed work schedules, 595 increased staff motivation with telecommuting). Therefore, they can be considered as no regrets 596 adaptations (Hallegatte, 2009 ). Overall, our indicator seems to better capture the drivers of adaptive 597 resilience than those of inherent resilience since none of the pro-active adaptations that were tested in 598 the regressions emerged as statistically significant. In that respect, it is likely that it still integrates a 599 sensitivity component that is not fully controlled for in the sensitivity indicator. The major challenge 600
for defining an appropriate resilience indicator is indeed removing the sensitivity component from the 601 economic impacts. This would allow focusing on the inherent and adaptive components of recovery. 602
In our research however, some variables were missing to better define sensitivity such as the volumes 603 of water needed per type of use for which the network is currently used by businesses. Essentially, 604
specifying the sensitivity of a firm based on survey data will always remain difficult, because 605 sensitivity relies on complex firm-specific production processes that cannot be accurately captured by 606 closed-ended format surveys. Better characterizing business sensitivity is a challenge for future 607
research. 608
From a methodological perspective, the use of a business survey allows reconstructing the likely 609 impacts and associated behaviours of individual businesses during and after disasters. This enables 610 assessing economic resilience ex-ante, even though some of its components are only manifest in the 611 post-disaster phase. Also, it allows harmonizing the level of hazard and exposition for all businesses 612 by setting identical hazard scenarios. However, resorting to an ex-ante business survey has certain 613 limitations. It carries large uncertainties regarding the actual impacts that would be suffered by 614 businesses in the event of a disaster since potential impacts are hypothetical and depend on how 615 businesses perceive their own vulnerability and adaptive capacity to disaster risks. Such declared 616
impacts are subject to strong cognitive and strategic biases (e.g. accounting for past experiences of 617 natural disasters such as hurricane Dean). Moreover, the robustness of the results highly depends on 618 the response rate and the representativeness of the sample. Here, the low response rate to the 619 questionnaire is mainly due to the poor use of emails for business communications in Martinique. The 620 length of the questionnaire (between 16 and 66 questions, depending on situations) and its filling time 621
(27 min on average) do not appear as major obstacles to participation since out of the 119 respondents 622 that did open the first page of the questionnaire, only 10% did not fill it entirely. Other possible 623 explanations stem from the fact that scenarios depict events that are frequent on the island or that it is 624 challenging to attract the interest of an audience when dealing with hypothetical future disaster 625 situations, not focusing on one particular past event. In the field of natural disasters, most surveys 626 targeting businesses were carried out in the aftermath of well-known past events. For instance, 627
interrogating businesses on the impacts of the Northridge earthquake in California using a mail survey, 628
Tierney (1997) reached a response rate of 23%. However the survey was carried out twenty years ago, 629 long before the mass use of questionnaire-based surveys and the competition it generates on the time 630 availability of respondents. The mailing was followed up by telephone calls, and the survey was 631 carried out sixteen months after the Northridge earthquake, dealing therefore with a real event still 632 very present in the mind of businesses. broadening the scope of potential impacts beyond financial impacts that are rather limited. Because it 657 is made of several subcomponents, our aggregated indicator is also highly dependent on the way 658 variables and indicators are weighted. However, since weights are based on insights from the literature 659
and not on local expert knowledge, our approach lacks an objective field-grounded weighting method. 660
Another limit pertains to the fuzzy distinction between pro-active adaptations and 661 general characteristics. For instance, resorting to inventories can be considered as a characteristic that 662 has nothing to do with anticipating the next hazard because it is a specificity of firms' operations or 663 because it does not result from a conscious risk mitigation strategy. This fuzziness could be a pitfall 664
for anyone willing to compare the influence of these two categories of explanatory variables on 665 economic resilience. Moreover, the size of the sample did not allow undertaking detailed sector and 666 spatial analysis of economic resilience although it would be useful to policy making and decision 667 makers in order to pinpoint hotspots of poor resilience. 668 669
Conclusion 670
In a context of increasing impacts of natural disasters and high concentration of economic activities in 671 dense urban environments, our research aimed at developing a scientifically sound operational 672 measure of the economic resilience of individual businesses to lifeline service interruptions caused by 673 natural disasters. We stabilized a conceptual framework pinpointing the peculiarities of resilience with 674 respect to pre-existing vulnerability and adaptation. As such, we provided an understandable and 675 useful analytical framework for both "risk" and "resilience" scientific communities whose definitions 676 and overall understanding of these concepts often lack consistency. We then used this conceptual 677 framework to build an operational indicator of the microeconomic resilience of individual businesses 678 that we applied, as an illustration of its interest, to an urban community located in an overseas 679 territory. Indicators of economic resilience are useful because they enable to empirically assess, map 680 and compare resilience within a population of businesses over a given territory while analyzing the 681 drivers of economic resilience, as illustrated in this paper. Moreover, they can also be used to adapt 682 production functions developed in classical macroeconomic models in order to account for resilience 683 of businesses and therefore provide more accurate assessments of the economic impacts of disasters. 684
The added-value of this research is threefold. First, it builds on previous work on resilience to 685 elaborate a conceptual framework that highlights the multidimensional nature of economic resilience 686 at the microeconomic level. This is of interest to identify the factors that determine the rebound 687 capacity of businesses which is at the core of resilience, as opposed to vulnerability and adaptation. 688
Second, it develops a methodology to measure the economic resilience of individual businesses using 689 empirical data. The indicator that is developed addresses two important shortcomings regarding the 690 measurement of individual economic resilience. It accounts for both market and non-market impacts 691 of disasters and therefore enlarges the scope of impacts considered in resilience assessments. It also 692
isolates pre-existing sensitivity to shocks from overall economic impacts and thereby allows 693 comparing pattern of resilience across businesses according to their ability to absorb and respond to a 694 shock, disregarding their pre-existing sensitivity to the shock. This avoids mistaking the root cause of 695 the economic impacts. In doing so, it differentiates businesses that are little impacted because they are 696 by essence little sensitive to the disaster from businesses that are little impacted because they are 697 resilient. Third, it enables to compare economic resilience among firms or events and thereby identify 698 the types of firms, sectors or geographical areas that are the most prone to suffer long-term damages 699 from disasters. This is of prime interest to elaborate targeted policy recommendations for building 700 resilient economies. 701
Understanding the drivers of resilience without mingling them with the drivers of sensitivity which is 702
per se embodied in current business practices and has nothing to do with its ability to cope with 703 upcoming events, will help develop efficient risk reduction policies targeted at businesses that 704 effectively lack resilience rather than businesses that are solely sensitive to the disaster but potentially 705 very well prepared to its effects. Our results illustrate the challenge of removing all sensitivity 706 components from resilience in an empirical exercise. 707
Although results should be used with caution, the application of our methodology to a case study in 708
the French West Indies shows that it is suited to test assumptions empirically. It confirms the essential 709 role of business size on resilience differentiating a positive effect of turnover on resilience and a 710 negative effect of the number of employees. Flexibility in working hours and production processes 711 also showed to be significant drivers of resilience. 712
Further research could investigate more thoroughly the inherent component of resilience. This is an 713 important issue since ex-ante risk reduction strategies would be more effective focusing on fostering 714 the resilience already built in business functioning than on anticipating the best ways of assisting 715 businesses during disasters when resources are scarce and the capacity to act is limited. Observing the 716 paths and dynamics that businesses follow when recovering would be also very instructive and should 717 be a perspective for future research in the field of economic resilience. Detailed examination of the 718 double counting issues when compiling resilience indicators such as the one suggested in this paper is 719 also an important challenge for the operationalization of the resilience concept. In addition, getting a 720 larger dataset would allow investigating the effect of more variables (e.g. economic sector, geographic 721 location, supplier diversification, production of perishable goods, previous disaster experience) and 722 explore the substitution effect between insurance and adaptation in order to better understand firm 723 strategies with regard to risk reduction. Ultimately, results aim at feeding broader resilience 724 assessments that account not only for individual resilience but also for both hazard characteristics and 725 systemic effects on overall economies. 726
